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John Willis - A Tribute
John Willis has been respected and loved in the Canadian legal
community as a teacher, colleague, and scholar for decades,
and one of his articles - Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell'
- is probably the best-known single piece of Canadian legal
writing. The law about government was his abiding interest
and the subject of most of his writing. This article is a study
of this writing, especially the writing done during the 1930s.
It is primarily part of an undertaking to understand the minds
of Canadian lawyers, but it is also a tribute. My conclusion
is that this writing was outstanding scholarship. Canadians do
not easily believe that one of us has been outstanding, not only
within our community but beyond, but this is my claim and
my tribute.
Both his preferences, and my tastes and limitations make
it a study of his writing and not a biography, but a few dates
and places in his life are a useful introduction. He was born
in England in 1907, and educated at Winchester and at Oxford,
graduating in 1929 with a 'double first' in classics and
jurisprudence. After teaching at a public school for a year he
went to Harvard Law School for two years, from 1930 to 1932.
He then returned to England, taught school for another year,
and in 1933 came to Canada and Dalhousie Law School. He
spent the next forty-seven years teaching at Dalhousie, Osgoode
Hall, the University of Toronto, and the University of British
Columbia, except for a year working for the International
Monetary Fund, and five years in practice in Halifax. He retired
in 1980, and now lives in Annapolis Royal.
Much of his writing was a challenge to the ideals about law
that were dominant during the second half of the nineteenth
century, and which can conveniently here be called the
*Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
1. (1938), Can BR 1.
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traditional ideals. 2 In these ideals - at least so far as Willis
and his generation understood them - the law was pre-
eminently common law, and its primary purpose was to establish
rights and boundaries for individual autonomy. To achieve this
purpose, a fundamental division was made between the public
and private worlds; obligation was conceived as a product of
will; and the proper form of the law was general and
comprehensive rules that contained little or no discretion and
that governed all individuals and the state equally. The courts
and the legal profession were crucial institutions in this vision,
because they were the custodians who declared and interpreted
these rules. The ideals made this function apolitical, and the
law, especially the common law, was perceived as a distinctive
and autonomous enterprise. These ideals were fundamentally
the same in England and the United States, although in England
the faith in precedent, especially the authority of single cases,
was more powerful, and in the United States there was a greater
emphasis on conceptual thinking about systems of rules.
These ideals included ideals about law and government, which
were expressed in their best-known form in Dicey's statement
of the rule of law, which he first proclaimed in 1885. 3 The
rule was expressed in three propositions: first, no person should
be subject to the power of the state except for a breach of
the law - the common law and statutes - determined by the
"ordinary courts." "In this sense the rule of law is contrasted
with . . . wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers." Second, all
2. Our understanding of these ideals is still incomplete, and - whatever
the state of our understanding may be - a short summary cannot avoid
distortion and oversimplification. For a couple of generations our
understanding has been shaped by the accounts of the progressives, especially
Roscoe Pound. Recent scholarship is illuminating, although much remains
to be done to explore the complexities of the thought and the differences
among England, the United States, and Canada. For the United States, see
Gordon "Legal thought and legal practice in the age of American enterprise"
in Geison (ed) Professions and Professional Ideologies in America, Gordon
"Book review" [White Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History] (1981),
94 Harvard LR 903, and Kennedy (1980), Research in Law and Sociology
3; for England, the best description is a book review, Sugarman "Book review"
["The legal boundaries of liberty: Dicey, liberalism and legal science" a review
of Cosgrove The Rule of Law: Albert Venn Dicey, Victorian Juristo (1983),
46 Modern LR 102. Even less has been done in Canada.
3. Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Constitution (1885), especially
ch. 4.
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persons, including all government officials, should be subject
to the ordinary law, and their liability should be enforceable
in the courts. Third, the rules of the constitution were established
in lawsuits brought by private persons. In a famous article about
the droit administratif written in 1903 Dicey proclaimed the
crucial role of the courts and the common law, and in 1915
he claimed that the continuing grant of powers to government
departments, especially powers to make judicial decisions, "saps
the foundations" of the rule of law, although he found its
salvation in the judicial supervision of government, through
review for ultra vires and unfair procedures, and through civil
actions.
4
So far as as this rule of law was a description of the current
state of English law, much of it was misleading or wrong. It
underestimated the extent of governmental functions and
discretion, and the significance of other forms of law, and it
exaggerated the liability of government - an action in tort
against a governmental official was less likely to succeed than
an action against a private individual. Yet Dicey's statement
of the rule of law was far more important as a statement of
ideals than as a description. These ideals became the established
creed about law and government. In England they shaped the
minds of generations of lawyers - and the legal education Willis
received at Oxford.
During the 1920s they were the basis of protests by lawyers
against the continuous expansion of the powers of government,
which culminated in Lord Hewart's New Despotism, published
in 1929. 5 Hewart claimed that there was "a persistent and well-
contrived system, intending to produce, and in practice
producing, a despotic power which ... places Government
departments above the Sovereignty of Parliament and beyond
the jurisdiction of the Courts."6 Extensive judicial and legislative
powers were being given to government departments; Parliament
was failing to supervise the use of these legislative powers;
statutes often seemed to forbid supervision by the courts; and,
more generally, the rule of law was being fundamentally
4. Dicey "Droit administratif in modern French law" (1901) 17 LQR 302,
and Dicey (1915), 31 LQR 148.
5. Hewart The New Depotism (1929)
6. Id., 14.
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subverted. Throughout, Hewart proclaimed the traditional
ideals and Dicey's rule of law.
The book was superficial and shrill, but it was much better
journalism than it was sustained thought. In response to the
prospect of its publication, the Lord Chancellor appointed a
powerful committee, the Donoughmore Committee, to consider
the "legislative, and judicial and quasi-judicial powers of
ministers and departments," and the safeguards needed to
"secure the constitutional principles of the sovereignty of
Parliament and the supremacy of the law." The committee
reported in 1932 and firmly denied any threat of injustice or
despotism. 7 It assumed and affirmed the traditional ideals; for
example, it affirmed the antithesis between law (general rules),
and discretion and arbitrariness, and it expressed a fundamental
faith in courts, including their apolitical functions and the
traditional approaches to interpretation. 8 It declared a need for
delegation of powers by Parliament, and made modest proposals
to accommodate these powers with the rule of law.
For delegated legislative powers, it proposed limits to the
kinds of powers that could be granted, supervision by Parliament
through committees, and unrestricted review by the courts for
ultra vires. For judicial and quasi-judicial powers, it made
definitions based on the distinction between law and discretion:
both were powers to determine disputes and required
presentations by the parties and determination of facts. Judicial
decisions were characterized by application of law, and quasi-
judicial decisions required the exercise of discretion. Decisions
that did not require presentations by parties or findings of facts
7. Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers (Cmd. 4060, London 1932).
The original chairman was the Earl of Donoughmore, who resigned and was
replaced by Sir Leslie Scott. The terms of reference are on page I.
8. The committee's comments on interpretation were probably provoked by
one of its members, Harold Laski, who wrote a short personal "note" as
an appendix to the report (at 135), in which he challenged the traditional
approaches and stressed the element of choice, and recommended permitting
use of a wider ranger of background materials in interpretation, especially
explanatory memoranda. Discussions during the 1920s and 1930s attacked
the restrictive rules on the use of background materials frequently, and far
more often than the likelihood of opportunities to use them might have
suggested. The issue might have seemed important because the use of these
materials may have seemed to threaten the ideal of autonomy in a simple
and dramatic way.
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were administrative. The principle of separation of powers
dictated that judicial decisions should usually be made by courts,
and quasi-judicial and administrative decisions should be made
by ministers or departments. 9
The traditional ideals, including the ideals about law and
government as they were expressed by the Donoughmore
committee, continued to be the dominant faith in England
throughout the 1930s, and the faith was not often examined,
or even remembered and displayed. The lawyers, especially the
academics, did remarkably little thinking and writing about law
and government, and the only significant thinking that was done,
and the only challenge to the ideals, was from a few scholars,
especially Robson, Laski and Jennings.
While the Donoughmore Committee was deliberating, Willis
was at Harvard, on a Commonwealth scholarship, and it was
an exciting time to be there. Two strands of thought are
especially significant for understanding him and his context.
The first was thought about the nature and purpose of law
generally. Early in the twentieth century, Pound proclaimed
a need for a "sociological jurisprudence;" he denounced the
"mechanical jurisprudence" of the nineteenth century and
declared that law must openly serve social purposes. Late in
the 1920's Pound himself was challenged by the realist
movement, led by Frank, Llewellyn, and Cohen, which made
an even more radical attack on the traditional ideals. In 1930,
the appearance of Frank's Law and The Modern Mind, and
a debate between Pound and Llewellyn' ° must have made a
dramatic contrast for Willis from the world he had left in Oxford.
The second strand was thought about law and government.
In the late nineteenth century lawyers and political scientists
had begun to study the agencies and judicial review as discrete
and important topics, and by 1930 the thought was much more
9. The principle was not rigid; for example, assigning judicial decisions to
departments (although not to ministers themselves) could be justified by a
large volume of cases, or a need for specialization or saving of cost. But,
the rule of law demanded that if judicial powers were assigned to departments,
the courts should enforce a right to natural justice, and supervise decisions
for errors of jurisdiction and law. The committee firmly rejected a proposal
made by Robson for supervision by a specialized administrative court rather
than the regular courts.
10. Llewellyn (1930), 30 Columbia LR 431, Pound (1931), 44 Harvard LR
697, and Llewellyn (1931), 44 Harvard LR 1222.
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extensive and rich than it was in England, even apart from
the distinctive constitutional issues.''. At Harvard, Felix
Frankfurter was inspiring a generation of colleagues and
students in courses in administrative law and public utilities.
Willis' BA did not entitle him to do a graduate degree and
a three year undergraduate programme seemed likely to be an
unattractive grind, and therefore he simply took courses he liked.
He came under the wing of Frankfurter, and his first book,
The Parliamentary Powers of English Government Depart-
ments, published in 1933, was written as a seminar paper for
Frankfurter. 12 It was a response to the dire warnings from
England about despotism, the irresponsible executive, and the
passing of the traditional constitutional ideals, and its
Introduction took express aim at The New Despotism. The
topic was the discretionary powers of government departments
that seemed to be insulated by statute from supervision by the
courts. 3 These were the powers where "the constitutional shoe
pinches," 4 and they had been the most common examples of
the alleged despotism. Like The New Despotism, it was
passionate and eloquent, but in contrast it was based on careful
11. Chase The American Law School and the Rise of Administrative
Government (Madison 1982) gives a description of the events and participants.
12. Willis The Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments
(Cambridge 1933).
13. More particularly, three kinds of powers were examined. The first was
powers to make delegated legislation that included provisions making the
rules as effective as if they were part of the statute or that made confirmation
by the minister "conclusive evidence" that the rules were properly made and
authorized; the second was powers given to ministers to confirm "schemes,"
especially schemes for housing re-development, that included similar provisions
to ensure validity; and the third was powers to modify statutes by order
or delegated legislation.
14. Parliamentary Powers, supra note 12, at 4.
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research and analysis. It was praised in reviews,' 5 but it is little
known today, perhaps because it seems so much limited to the
particular controversies of its times.
Throughout the book, Willis observed with unusual clarity
how government was changing. In the early twentieth century,
the State had changed its character, had ceased to be soldier
and policeman, and was rapidly becoming protector and
nurse. .. . Again the rights of the community bulk larger
than the rights of the individual.'
6
But his observation went far beyond the general changes in
function and sheer growth, which were obvious by 1930. He
saw subtle changes in the structure and functions of legal
institutions, and saw how many of the changes had been made
through the accumulation of changes in procedure and
administrative powers. The implications of these changes were
not realized,
until there comes a day when trivial changes of procedure,
cumulative in their effect, each precedent going a little further
than the one before it, have gnawed their way into the fabric
of substance, and the elaborate, supposedly perpetual edifice
of a constitutional theory is seen to be tottering to its fall.
Then and only then is a cry raised, and as if to compensate
15. Some of the reviews were, Laski (1934), 47 Harvard LR 1453 ("This
is the best book that has been published on delegated legislation in England.
It has learning, it is well written, and it possesses what is still rare in books
of law - a graceful power of wit."), E.C.S.W. (1934), Cambridge LJ 428,
MacDonald (1934), 20 Cornell LQ 536, Dobie (1933), 82 U Pennsylvania
LR 198, Fuchs (1934), 20 St. Louis LR 189, Fairlie (1934), 27 American
Political Science Rev. 994, Finkelman (1935), I U Toronto L (". . . Mr.
Willis's study remains the most outstanding contribution yet made to the
subject of administrative legislation."), Sayre (1934), 19 Iowa LR 652 ("...
the best treatment of delegated legislation in England that has so far appeared
... well written, even brilliantly written."), Corry (1934), 12 Can BR 60,
Vaile (1934), 20 ABAJ 776, Robson (1934), 50 LQR 282 ("This is a book
of the first importance, by virtue not only of the subject with which it deals
but also because of the brilliant and profound treatment which it receives."),
and Robson (again!) (1934), 34 Columbia LR 189 ("Mr. Willis's book must
undoubtedly rank as the most important treatise on delegated legislation which
has so far been published in the English language.").
16. Parliamentary Powers, supra note 12, at 13 and 51.
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for their blind apathy, party leaders open the flood gates
of oratory and swamp the issues in swirling rhetoric.'
7
Willis demonstrated through careful and extensive research
in the statutes that most of the powers he was considering were
narrower and more circumscribed than the attacks on them
had suggested. They had an extensive and respectable history,
and had not appeared suddenly in the 1920s as a result of some
nefarious plot of officials. He argued powerfully and
passionately that these powers were necessary for the modern
state. Of course, what was necessary and reasonable was
debatable, and in making this argument he demonstrated an
attitude that would continue throughout his writing - a
willingness to accept the modern state, a willingness to give
extensive powers to government, and a great faith in expertise.
The widening of the field of government brought to the
departments new legislative powers, for who else could deal
effectively with matters that required special knowledge of
conditions and special skill? . . . But it does not follow, as
some writers have thought, that power leads to arbitrary
methods; at no other time has such an effort been made
to take action on the basis of fact rather than conjecture
.... The civil service [is] the best informed and most forward-
looking body of persons in England to-day.... The rational
of ... delegation . . . is . . to give full play to the
determinations of the expert.' 8
He was determined to study "what really happens," rather
than the formal legal doctrine, and he believed that the important
reality of government was the daily routine of government
business, and not the more dramatic conflicts in courts and
Parliament.' 9 The major argument of the book was his belief
that the test of the existence of the new despotism should be
the ways in which powers had actually been used, and not the
17. Id. 9. Willis understood that changes in legislation were often incremental
and cumulative, like changes in the common law, and he stated this perception
long before Horack's famous article (1937), 23 Iowa LR 41. For example,
"the process of generalisation, the very life of the Common Law imperceptibly
goes on in the field of legislation, .... " (at 118).
18. Id., 33, 35, 113 and 157. See also 104, 132, 153 and 159-163.
19. Id., 58. Closely associated with this understanding was a belief, which
he did not develop extensively, that effective legal arrangements must be
designed for particular contexts, for example, at 1557. This emphasis on facts
and "what really happens" was probably stimulated by Frankfurter, see
Frankfurter (1927), 75 U Pennsylvania LR 614, at 620.
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ways in which they might have been used or the fate of abstract
constitutional principles. He asserted that the use of the powers
had not impinged unreasonably upon individual rights.
The generality of the words used is not in itself important;
the proper question is what has in fact been done under those
words. . . . Questions of government cannot be settled by
drawing analogies from the behaviour of a pickpocket when
the policeman is off his beat. 20
This emphasis on facts was one of the distinctive elements
of legal thought in the United States in the twentieth century,
especially the thought of the realists. Of course, lawyers cannot
ignore facts, but the emphasis on generalization and abstraction
in the traditional ideals seemed to diminish the significance of
particular facts. Willis'concern was intense even by the standards
of the realists, and his argument that the test of the existence
of a new despotism and infringements of individual rights should
depend solely upon what actually happened was distinctive.
Parts of this argument led into statutory interpretation,
because the decisions of the courts about the terms that sought
to insulate administrative action from review began to change
just as he was writing. An early willingness to give the terms
a substantial effect gave way to a very narrow reading that
made them virtually ineffective. In discussing the recent cases,
Willis squarely challenged the traditional ideals about
interpretation. He declared that words did not have plain
meanings, and that interpretation was not autonomous and
apolitical.
The courts . purport to deal only with questions of power
and not questions of policy; but since their decisions rest
mainly on statutory interpretation, and ambiguous words
derive their force not from any innate virtue of their own
but from what the interpreter puts into them, these decisions
are in effect judgments of a court upon what in their opinion
should be the scope of executive discretion.2l
And he left no doubt that he believed the courts had been
hostile towards executive powers, especially in the recent past.
He did not undertake to analyze in any comprehensive way
why this antipathy existed, although he did suggest that common
20. Id., 104 and 152. See also 57, 101, 104, 108, 152-56, and 166.
21. Id., 112. See also 81. His attitudes about statutory interpretation contrasted
sharply with the traditional faith of the Donoughmore Committee.
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law values were one of the major causes. The courts saw the
legislation "through the fog of the common law,"
So comes about the doctrine that statutes are to be interpreted
strictly, that there is a presumption in favour of the liberty
of the subject and the result of the doctrine, that it is not
thought malpropos to measure modern development by the
yardstick of the Case of Proclamations.
22
This understanding, coupled with a strong dislike of privilege,
led him to comment harshly on some of the recent cases, which
had involved attacks by property owners on orders confirming
urban housing redevelopment schemes. Willis claimed that the
courts delayed "great improvements" by performing their "legal
acrobatics" for the benefit of "worthless slum owners." 23 More
generally, he argued that these attitudes made the courts
inappropriate to supervise government, and he proposed a
system of specialized courts. ". . . [W]hy should our system
of government be conceived of as a pyramid with the courts
at the apex . . .? Who shall be the final interpreters of social
legislation and in what spirit shall they approach the task?"
The courts had frustrated the objectives of the Parliament, and
therefore ". . . a new system of government must be administered
by those who do not draw their inspiration from Common Law
analogies. "24
His perceptions of the changes in government led to the
realization that these changes and the values that inspired them
were inconsistent with the traditional ideals and assumptions
about the constitution and law and government. He was
especially eloquent and biting about the way in which lawyers
managed to carry both the reality and these ideals in their heads
at the same time.
... [T]he English lawyer, with his strange but quite
intelligible aptitude for divorcing life from law . . ., failed
to realize the significant changes going on beneath the
trappings of legal theory .... [T]o a lawyer a statute does
not speak the living language of the day. Lawyer's ears are
attuned to the accents of the forgotten past, new commands
are faintly apprehended through the fog of the Common
Law.
2 5
22. Id., 51. See also 113 and 148.
23. Id., 42, 78, and 104.
24. Id., 113, 148 and 171-72.
25. Id., 5 and 51. See also 29 and 112.
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Willis returned to England in 1932 with a promise of a
university position, which perished in the depression, and a
year later he was offered a job at Dalhousie Law School for
a year, as a replacement for a faculty member who was going
on leave. He came for want of any other opportunities, and
stayed. During the next two years he published two articles
- one about the report of the Donoughmore committee and
the other about local government in England - two book
reviews, and a case comment. 26 His next important piece of
writing, Three Approaches to Administrative Law, 27 appeared
in 1935, and it is the piece of his writing I admire most, because
it has the most impressive combination of insight, wit and
passion, and an orderly framework for analysis. He began by
describing the expansion of government and its institutions.
The most common framework in the legal literature for
description and analysis of government had been the distinction
between judicial and legislative powers, but Willis saw that this
framework was inadequate to accommodate the diversity of
powers and functions, and especially inappropriate for the
independent regulatory agency, which was becoming common
in Canada and which he called a "government in miniature. '28
He then stated his theme: "The practical problem is how to
get into our constitutional structure these new institutions whose
growth seems inevitable." The answer depended, "as will the
26. The delegation of legislative and judicial powers to administrative bodies
(1933), 18 Iowa LR 150, "Book review" [Moley and Wallace Administration
of Justice] (1933), I1 Can BR 705, "Case comment" [Right of a principal
to sue on a promise under seal made to an agent in agent's name - trust
of a chose in action - Harmer v. Armstrong, [1934] 1 Ch 65]; (1934), 12
Can BR 183, 7 Aust LJ 424, 1 Sol J 47, "Book review" [Haines American
Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy] (1934), 12 Can BR 597, and "Parliament
and the local authorities" in Laski, Jennings and Robson eds. A Century
of Municipal Progress (1935), 400
27. (1935), 1 U Toronto LJ 53. In 1942 he sent a paper to his friend "Caesar"
Wright, the editor of the Canadian Bar Review, and said, "the only thing
I beg of you is to not tone it down. In 1935 1 wrote an article for Kennedy
[the editor of the UTLJ] and he toned it down, and now . . . I find myself
faced with a mass of milk and water Willis which is much more disgusting
than the real article." (Wright Papers, University of Toronto Archives, Willis
to Wright, December 29, 1942) 1 would be glad indeed to be able to read
the original version.
28. Willis borrowed this effective phrase from a mid-nineteenth century article;
for its origins, see Arthurs "Without the Law' Administrative Justice and
Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England (Toronto 1985).
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solution of most problems of administrative law, upon the
approach," and he described three possible approaches - the
judicial, the conceptual, and the functional. 29
The judicial approach had been frankly hostile "to the new
institutions," and here Willis expanded the analysis he had begun
in Parliamentary Powers. He demonstrated the hostility by
tracing its development in English decisions during the
preceeding half century, and he condemned the approach, more
by implication than expressly, because it was inconsistent with
the preferences clearly expressed by the legislatures. He
suggested three reasons. First, the agencies were created by
statute, but the courts were hostile to statutes as a form of
law. "A statute is strictly construed. It is placed against the
background of a common law whose assumptions are directly
opposed to those of modern legislation." Second the courts
were faithful to the common law and the "uncompromisingly
individualistic" values it expressed. The application of these
values, especially as expressed in presumptions, "goes far to
nullify the effect of statutes which emphasize not the rights
of the subject but the claims of the state upon him." The third
reason was that the courts were "uncompromisingly hostile to
the executive. " 30 These reasons may have permitted the inference
that if only the judges would improve their processes and ways
of reasoning, the results they reached would be better. He did
not expressly suggest that the results were also determined by
the general social or political values of the courts or by class
power, although the general mood of his discussion suggested
these influences. Allegations that the courts had been
unsympathetic to the modern administrative state were familiar
in the United States, but in England only a few scholars, again
primarily Robson, Laski, and Jennings were making similar
claims. In Canada, the issue had barely been raised.
Willis also condemned the conceptual approach. His
discussion was provocative and insightful, even though it was
vague at some crucial turns and ultimately incomplete. His
understanding of conceptual reasoning can be illuminated by
a brief reference to an otherwise unrelated article he wrote about
conflicts of laws, in which he described conceptual reasoning
29. "Three approaches," supra note 27, at 59.
30. Id., 60 and 61
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as "the deduction of specific rules from a consistent legal theory
of the nature of conflict of laws," and contrasted it to a
"practical" approach that stressed "justice and convenience. " 31
In Three Approaches. . . he began by asserting that concepts
were necessary elements of legal reasoning, and he gave as
examples of concepts, trust, bailment, and the distinction
between judicial and administrative powers. The concepts were
to be applied by courts to facts to resolve disputes, but sometimes
two or more concepts seemed to apply. The choice among them
was an expression of values and not a product of reasoning
from the "legal" premises, and the decision could only be made
by resort to a theory - "really not a question of law but of
political science." 32 The forms of legal thinking often obscured
the nature of this choice, and concepts became ends in themselves
and fixed in particular forms of words that obscured the original
purposes and the theories behind them. His major example of
the limitations of conceptual thinking was the efforts of the
Donoughmore committee to allocate functions of government
by using the concepts judicial and administrative as though
they had some firm and useful meaning.
In this discussion of conceptual reasoning, Willis had tackled
deep and much-debated issues about legal reasoning. Much of
the twentieth-century challenge to the traditional ideals was a
denial of its vision of reasoning from general principles. From
Holmes to the realists, legal thinkers asserted that the choices
of principles were arbitrary, and that more than one result could
be derived from any given principle. Willis shared these attitudes,
although he did not elaborate them rigorously or express them
in any original way. He did, however, understand how
profoundly ideas could shape perceptions and conduct, and the
dangers of responding to questions of values by reciting familiar
and comfortable dogma.
Willis clearly preferred the functional approach, and
distinguished it from the conceptual approach.
The problem put is, how shall the powers of government
be divided up? The problem is neither one of law nor of
formal logic, but of expediency. The functional approach
31. (1936), 14 Can BR 1, at 2 and 1.
32. "Three approaches ... ," supra note 27, at 70.
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examines, first, the existing functions of existing governmen-
tal bodies in order to discover what kind of work each has
in the past done best, and assigns the new work to the body
which experience has shown best fitted to perform work of
that type. If there is no such body, a new one is created
ad hoc ...A proposal to empower a department to make
regulations under a statute should not then, be met with the
question, "Is the legislature delegating legislative power?" but
rather "Is the department or the legislature itself better fitted
to make a decision of this kind?"
33
Lawyers cannot ignore function any more than they can ignore
facts, and concern for the appropriate function of institutions
without the word "functional," existed long before the twentieth
century, for example, in the doctrine of separation of powers,
and the allocation of functions between judge and jury. In the
United States, it appeared in thinking about administrative
agencies in the late nineteenth century, and it emerged as a
major and express approach in the 1930s. Willis was among
the first scholars to apply it expressly and specifically to the
design of the agencies. He used it to explain and justify the
creation of particular kinds of agencies, for example, licensing
agencies, and as the basis for proposals for supervising them.
He had no doubt that some supervision was necessary, and
that the courts were inappropriate, "for they have no experience
of administrative policy . . ." The appropriate institution was
"an independent body, composed of persons trained in the
practice of the whole law pertaining to administration.
34
From 1936 to 1938 he published two articles, one case
comment, and four book reviews, including enthusiastic and
provocative reviews of Thurman Arnold's The Symbols of
Government and The Folklore of Capitalism.35 Willis shared
Arnold's perceptions and way with words, although he tended
to be caustic where Arnold was ironic. At Dalhousie, he taught
only the traditional common law subjects until 1937, when he
33. Id., 75.
34. Id., 80.
35. (1936), 14 Can BR 457, (1936), 14 Can BR 1, "Book review" [Arnold
The Symbols of Government] (1936), 14 Can BR 278, "Case comment"
[Jurisdiction of courts - action to recover damages for injury to foreign
land - Albert v Fraser, [1937] 1 DLR 39] (1937), 15 Can BR 112, "Book
review" [Jennings Cabinet Government] (1937), 15 Can BR 579, "Book review"
[Arnold The Folklore of Capitalism] (1938), 16 Can BR 417, and "Book
review" [Curtis World Order] 1938, Can BR 154.
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began a course in statutes and administrative law. During that
summer, he wrote a short introduction to the course for his
students, which appeared in 1938 as Statute Interpretation in
a Nutshell.36 It was both a realistic guide to understanding the
process of interpretation and a powerful attack on the traditional
faith. Its iconoclastic attitude was expressed in the first few
words, "If you are trying to guess what meaning a court will
attach to a section in a statute. . ." Guessing must have seemed
inconsistent with the rule of law, if not impertinent. Willis
asserted that the traditional sources and techniques did not and
could not determine outcomes in difficult cases: "No technique
has much effect on final result. . .". The texts on statutory
interpretation were unreliable, because they asserted "one great
sun of a principle - the "plain meaning rule . . . around which
revolve in planetary order a series of minor rules of
construction," and the crucial element was not any one principle
or technique, but the choice of approach. The texts took no
account of the context of place and time, and they displayed
what courts said, and not what courts did. "What will they
do, and not what they will say, is your concern." Dictionaries
and rules of grammar, such as the ejusdem generis rule, were
equally unreliable, because they permitted wide ranges of
choices. The plain, meaning rule was rarely useful, because the
growth of social legislation made "wide and general terms"
dominant, and it usually was no more than "a device whereby
to acheive some desired result." The "golden rule" was much
the same, because the perception of an absurdity depended "on
the social. and political views of the men who happen to be
sitting on the case."
37
In difficult cases, the courts usually chose between the
"mischief rule" and presumptions. The mischief rule was
"sensible and . . . thoroughly in accord with the constitutional
principle of supremacy of parliament," but it was unworkable,
because the rules that excluded evidence of parliamentary
material made it impossible for judges to determine the policy
and purpose. Again, it served merely "to acheive a desired
result." Presumptions were a "common law 'Bill of Rights"',
although many of them, for example the presumptions against
36. Supra note 1
37. Id., 4, 2, 11, 11, and 13.
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taking away property or common law rights, were opposed to
the spirit of much of the social legislation, and none of them
could determine the outcome of particular cases. Again, the
crucial element was the approach and the attitude of the court.38
By 1938 much had been written about statutory interpretation,
and assertions that words did not have plain meanings and
that judges often had a choice were far from novel. The Nutshell
was distinctive because of its effective unmasking of the
traditional sources and techniques, and its emphasis on
particular contexts and approaches. It gave a lawyers seeking
either to guess what a court might do or to persuade a court
to reach a particular result a realistic understanding of the
process of interpretation. It may have seemed dangerous -
and impertinent, but it contained nothing that challenged the
supremacy of parliament or a rule of law, and it affirmed the
obligation of courts to respect the purposes of the legislature
and to make sense of a statute. However, despite its fame, it
seems to me to be less perceptive and creative than Three
Approaches. . ., and less carefully ordered.
Willis' next major article was Administrative Approaches and
the British North America Act, which appeared in the Harvard
Law Review in 1939. 39 Its major purpose was to demonstrate
that courts in England and Canada had imposed limitations
on administrative powers that were similar to the constitutional
requirements of separation of powers and due process in the
United States. These limitations had been imposed despite
legislative supremacy, through interpretation of statutes and
the British North America Act. The first part discussed the
possibility that a faith in the separation of powers might support
common law limitations on delegated legislative powers
(delegated legislation). In the United States limitations had been
imposed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
and had been ressurrected in the late 1930s. The Supreme Court
of Canada and the Privy Council had approved these powers,
but had left open the possibility of imposing limits. In 1937,
trial courts in British Columbia and Alberta had characterized
grants of wise rule-making powers as abdications of the
legislative function, although an appeal to the Privy Council
38. Id., 14, 15 and 17
39. (1939), 53 Harvard LR 251.
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had upheld the particular powers. Willis thought that limits
might still be imposed, although he did not explore their nature
or extent. The second part of the article discussed Section 96
of the British North America Act, which provided that the
federal government "shall appoint the Judges of the Superior
District and County Courts in each Province." The original
purposes of this section are obscure, but it had been interpreted
by the courts as forbiding the provinces from granting at least
the powers that were exercised by Superior Court judges at
confederation and perhaps from granting powers to perform
any "judicial" functions at all. Willis argued that this
interpretation strained both the terms and any possible purposes
of the section, and was a product of the courts' desire to protect
their accustomed authority. "We can only . . .marvel at the
way in which deeply held political beliefs succeed in establishing
themselves in the most unlikely phrases of constitutions." 40
The last and most important part considered the work of
the courts in review of administrative action. He expanded the
insight, which he had introduced in the Nutshell, that the courts
had created a "common-law bill of rights" 4' and here he used
the presumptions about access to the courts, and about
procedure as examples. He argued that use of the presumption
about access in interpreting privative clauses demonstrated a
lack of respect for the declared preferences of the legislatures,
and that the courts had again sought to protect their accustomed
power.
To set up the presumption on the teeth of [the] legislative
history is to fly in the face of the legislature. . . .They now
use it . . . as a means of controlling an expressed intent of
which they happen to disapprove. The presumption is now,
in substance, a rule of constitutional law masquerading as
a rule of construction.
42
The presumptions about procedure expressed important
values, although Willis wondered whether in recent cases the
courts had diminished the range of choice were permitted to
exercise agencies and begun to require a trial-type hearing
40. Id., 271.
41. Id., 274 and 281.
42. Id., 276. Again, he was the first Canadian scholar to present an insight
that eventually became part of the common stock; see Evans, Janisch, Mullan
and Risk Administrative Law (Toronto 2ed 1984) ch. 11.
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regardless of context. The observation that the results courts
reach in England, the United States, and Canada - especially
in administrative law - are often similar despite deep
constitutional differences is now commonplace, but Willis was
the first scholar to express it coherently, and his phrase -
"4a common law bill of rights" - is wonderfully expressive.
In 1941 he edited a collection of essays, Canadian Boards
at Work, for which he wrote a preface and short introductions
to several parts. The purpose was to give "a description of what
Canadian boards in fact do." In the preface, .he described the
growth of the administration more extensively than he had in
Parliamentary Powers. Governments had undertaken a "creative
role" and legislature and courts were unable to provide "creative
realization of policy ... continuous realization of policy ...
and specialized knowledge . . ." In Canada, the independent
commission had become the dominant form of administration,
perhaps because Canadians had a "horror of 'politics' and this
form "helps to preserve the illusion that questions of policy
can be 'kept out of politics."' He returned to his emphasis on
commissions as 'governments in miniature,' and stressed the
diversity "in history, object and methods of operation. '43 Again
he stressed discretion, and saw that legislature often left
development of policy to the agencies.
If anybody asks what, exactly, the legislature thought it meant
by the indefinite expressions 'unjust discrimination' or 'public
convenience and necessity there is no difficulty about the
correct answer; it meant nothing. Their 'meaning' was
deliberately left to the boards; the boards were expected to
put into these expressions the 'meaning' that experience
demanded; they were expected, in the economist's language,
to invent their own economic theory, or in the language of
a lawyer, to find their own law. And this they have done
- with the result that we have in Canada an impressive
body of administrative case law, which owes nothing to
legislatures and practically nothing to courts but is not-nearly
as well known as it deserves to be.
44
But the major theme of his contributions was the
emphasis on what boards do; "who, except a lawyer or a
political theorist, cares what any board conceptually 'is' as long
43. Id., v-viii.
44. Id., 69-70.
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as he knows what it in fact does?" No simpler statement of
the functionalist creed could be made. He pursued this theme
in two contexts - control of the agencies, and their procedures.
About controls by the courts and the legislatures he said, "In
practice these controls are almost always unreal . . . but the
absence of the traditional safeguards does not mean there are
no safeguards at all; the professional pride which is not peculiar
to judges and the glare of publicity which beats more fiercely
on boards than it ever does on courts well be substitutes." He
returned to the argument he made in Parliamentary Powers
- "too much attention is paid to what boards are permitted
to do on paper and too little to what the individual board
really does in real life . . . which boards in fact behave
irresponsibly and how and when, is the only question which
there is any point in answering." The effect of studying what
really happened would "exorcise the bogey of the 'new
despotism' with which Lord Hewart and others have tried to
frighten us."
'45
His analysis of procedures perceived clearly the problem of
the appropriateness of procedures and the limits of the trial-
type hearing. Most lawyers "assume that in the orthodox hearing
before a court the technique of fair-minded investigation has
reached a fixed and final form." 46 He specified some of the
pressing problems of procedure, for example, the utility of
lawyers, the representation of the public interest, the need for
openess, the utility of the common-law rules of evidence, and
the difficult balance between designing distinctive procedures
for the particular contexts and having uniform and familiar
procedures to enable lawyers to participate without being
specialists.
Problems like these - and these are the real problems of
administrative procedure - cannot be met by the quoting
of concepts culled from the philosophic blue; they can only
be resolved by facts, finding out what actually goes on, and
by experience, doing something and then seeing what
happens.
47
45. Id., 2, 66, 70 and 71.
46. Id., 117.
47. Id., 119.
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His perceptions of the issues to be thought about, especially
the function of agencies in elaborating policy, the effectiveness
of different kinds of controls, and the procedural needs and
problems, was better than anything being written in England
or Canada, although it was not as sophisticated and sustained
as the best writing in the United States.
4 8
Early in the early 1940s he wrote two more articles about
law and government - Section 96 of the British North America
Act (1940) and Delegatus Non Potest Delegare (1943). 49 Both
were utterly different from the writing I have already described,
because they were straightforward and straightfaced expositions
of doctrine.50 They demonstrated a powerful ability to see
patterns and trends in cases, and to organize and generalize,
but this ability alone would hardly make him worth writing
about now. 5' They are an expression of a faith, which appears
in other passages in his writing, that doctrine can make sense.
They also demonstrate an ambivalence about lawyers. Despite
the implications and power of his own writing, he often took
the lawyers' enterprise seriously and wished them to take him
seriously. He acknowledged this ambivalence in 1969 in a
convocation address entitled "What I Like and What I Don't
Like about Lawyers." He explained his title by saying "1 have,
all my working life, been torn between admiration and dislike
48. See, for example, Landis The Administrative Process (New Haven 1938),
and a symposium, (1937), 47 Yale LJ 515.
49. (1940), 18 Can BR 517, and (1943), 21 Can BR 267.
50. When he sent "Section 96" to his friend "Caesar" Wright, the editor
of the Canadian Bar Review, he said, "I have sternly repressed my incessant
desire to be funny or caustic about constitutional law." (University of Toronto
Archives, Wright Papers, Willis to Wright, June 19, 1940).
51. See Evans, Janisch, Mullan and Risk, supra note 42, at 264, where a
passage from "Delegatus non potest delagare" is used to present the basic
ideas about delegation. Another example of this ability is contained in the
letter referred to in note 50, supra. He said that if he had a secure future
at Dalhousie - he feared for its very existence - he would try to write
a book on "judicial control of administrative authorities, which would deal
with such matters, inter alia as certiorari, persona designata, jurisdictional
fact, bias, and a host of other matters which have to be dug out at the
present from the most unlikely articles in Halsbury ... This book could
be based largely on a course I give on Judicial Control here ... " In short
he perceived "administrative law" as a discrete and unified subject long before
DeSmith wrote Judicial Control of Administrative Action, and made it
apparent to the English. This perception probably began in his experience
in the United States.
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of the whole lot - what in the jargon of today would be called
love-hate relationship."
52
In the decade from 1933 to 1943, Willis wrote a total of
twenty-two items - two books, nine articles, two case
comments, and one letter to the editor. Almost all were about
law and government, and they expressed the thoughts and beliefs
he held throughout his working life. The performance is
remarkable, and it is all the more remarkable considering a
heavy teaching load, administrative responsibilities, and worries
that his school might vanish overnight and with it his job.
5 3
It was the best writing about law and government done in
Canada in the 1930s, by lawyers, political scientists, or
historians, and it was the best common law scholarship of any
kind. 54 It deserves to be compared to the best writing done
in England and the United States.
His later writing elaborated these beliefs and widened into
other areas, especially criminal law, taxation, and legal
education. 55 For the purposes of this study, four of the later
articles can usefully be discussed and they can be divided into
two pairs. The first is Administrative Law in Canada, written
for an international conference in 1961, and Canadian
Administrative Law in Retrospect, the Cecil Wright Memorial
Lecture at the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto
in 1974.56 The first was an attempt "to describe in a dead-pan
and non-polemical way for non-Canadians what seemed to me
to be distinctively Canadian attitudes and methods." 57 It served
its purpose, but here it is interesting only for observations about
the ways in which the experience in Canada combined the
52. Willis "What I like and what I don't like about lawyers" (1976) 76 Queen's
Quarterly 1, at 53.
53. See his own history of Dalhousie - A History of Dalhousie Law School
(Toronto 1979), Part I, Section Four.
54. This may be a debatable claim, but this is not the appropriate place
to defend it thoroughly. Most of the writing in the journals was description
and formal analysis of doctrine, and the efforts to do more were dominated
by uplifting but vague invocations of Pound and Cardozo. There are some
sparkling exceptions, especially in some of the writing by Wright, the young
Laskin, and Kennedy (whose vision is underestimated), but none of them
produced as much original and insightful scholarship during the 1930s as
Willis.
55. A list of his publications is given in the appendix.
56. (1961), 39 Can BR 251, and (1974), 24 U Toronto LJ 225,
57. Id., 251.
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experiences in England and the United States, and for a
provocative guess about Canadian legal history:
Administrative law has never raised in Canada the storms
of public controverly that it did in England and the United
States. The reason may be that Canada has never been is
not and never could be a laissez-faire state.
58
The observation is correct, and the explanation parallels much
of the thinking of the historians at the time, although the full
explanation must include consideration of ideologies and the
power of economic interests.
The "Retrospect" summarized much of what he had thought
throughout his life. He warned his audience that he was a
"government man," a "legislation man," and a "what actually
happens man." He contrasted "what really happens" to the
"theology" of administrative law" and he made this plea to
his audience: "Do not, I beg of you, be global and theological:
be specific and practical. . ." He also made a telling observation
about narrowing visions of scholarship and teaching. He said
that any administrative law course given in the 1970s "will always
be far more professional and far less political-science oriented
today than it would have been in the thirties. . .59
In the second pair of articles Willis fought dragons that he
had fought long ago on the battlefields of the 1930s. The first
was a case comment about Canadian Wheat Board v. Hallet
and Carey and a letter to the editor in response to two attacks
that it provoked,60 and the second was The McRuer Report:
Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values,6 1 which was a review
of the first volume of the McRuer Report. Both were full of
exaggerations and oversimplifications aroused by the heat of
battle, but they have passion and insight that are still striking
and useful. The Wheat Board case arose out of the readjustment
of the economy after World War Two. The National Emergency
Transitional Powers Act gave the government power to "make
... such ... regulations as it may ... deem necessary or
58. Id., 253.
59. Id., 225-28.
60. "Case Comment" [Statute interpretation - real constitution versus
lawyer's constitution - form versus substance - courts and public law -
Canadian Wheat Board v Hallet and Carey and Nolan, [1951] 1 DLR 468]
(1951), 29 Can BR 296, and "Letter to the editor" (1951), 29 Can BR 580.
61. (1968) 18 U Toronto LJ 351.
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advisable for the purpose of, (a) maintaining, controlling and
regulating . . . prices . . ." It decided to raise the floor price
of barley, and, in order to avoid permitting commercial dealers
to reap windfall profits, sought to expropriate the grain they
held, pay them the old floor price, and resell it to them at
the new price. Nolan, a dealer who lived in Chicago, challenged
the regulation that implemented this policy, and the Supreme
Court declared it ultra vires.
Willis was outraged by the result in favour of "the Chicago
Hampden," and more outraged by the reasoning, and especially
by its "appaling air of unreality." He alleged two reasons for
this unreality. The first was "the symbolical language of the
law," which was "harmless enough if not allowed to conceal
realities," but unfortunately, the courts "from time to time...
pass imperceptibly from the twilight of this symbolical language
of the law into a Stygian fairyland peopled by bogies of dead
tyrants." Issues about the modern state perceived as battles
between Lord Coke and the Stuart despots. The second reason
was presumptions, especially the presumption about property,
which led lawyers "to read measures implementing the twentieth
century constitution through the spectacles of the nineteenth
century constitution." All of this learning about the "lawyers
constitution" had led the Supreme Court to be "unerringly
wrong" in asserting the intention of the legislature, "which it
is their constitutional function to implement." Willis did not
explain how he determined the intention, but presumably his
reasoning was that avoiding windfall profits was an incident
of "controlling prices." 62 He was torn about the prospects of
an appeal, because it might bring a sensible result at the cost
of damage to the newly-gained independence of Canadian
courts. Whatever his preference might have been, the Privy
Council vindicated his reasoning and reversed the Supreme
Court.
63
62. He did not deal with an issue raised by Rand J, whose judgment was
the only one that did seem to him to take account of the twentieth century
realities, but who joined the majority, because the regulation did not obligate
the government to offer the barley to the dealers, and was therefore not
limited to the permitted purposes. Nor did the Privy Council deal with this
issue.
63.1d., 229, 239, 302 and 303.
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Two lawyers wrote separate letters to the editor, before the
Privy Council decision might have given Willis some claim to
respectibility. and shared the same horror at what he had said.
To them, the choice at stake was between the rule of law and
totalitarianism, and between private enterprise and socialism,
and there was no doubt which choices they attributed to Willis
and preferred themselves. Review of the agencies by the courts
stood between civilization, and totalitarianism, Hitlerism, and
Stalinism. "Freedom in thought and speech must go hand in
hand with a free economy, . . . in which there is some respect
for private property .... It is not yet a crime to make a profit."
64
Willis did not recant. In his reply, he restated his beliefs even
more passionately, especially his beliefs about "the immense
gap between the legal theory of the State and the State as she
actually operates - a source of perpetual astonishment to the
bewildered layman," which, he illustrated by saying, "It is not
yet a crime to make a profit, is only perfectly true in an economy
which knows not price control."
65
The review of the McRuer Report demonstrated the same
spirit. In 1964, the Honourable J.C. McRuer, then Chief Justice
of the High Court of Ontario, was appointed a commissioner
to enquire into "personal freedoms, rights, and liberties." In
1968 he submitted his first report, which was composed of three
volumes. 66 The first was a statement of general principles, and
it was an elegant and uncritical expression of faith in the
traditional vision of the law about government and the basic
common law principles of administrative law doctrine. The
second volume was about the courts and the third was about
specific governmental functions, such as expropriation and
professional regulation.
In his review, Willis observed a difference between the
"abstract and legalistic" tone of the first, and the "practical
and sensible" tone of the second and third. He saw the first
as "characteristic of the 'establishment' side of the thirties," and
wished for "a posse of Davids," to fight the Goliath. He fought
against the preoccupation with "ideology," rather than the
64. Id., 552, 578, and 580. These attacks were similar to attacks made on
the realists at the end of the 1930s.
65. Id., 583.
66. Royal Commission, Inquiry into Civil Rights, Report Number One
(Toronto 1968).
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question "who is now getting hurt by what and in what ways,"
and against a bias in favour of lawyers' values - individual
rights, the common law, and the courts. He summarized the
entire approach of the volume in his discussion of judicial review
by saying "the Commission, however, once again approaches
its problem globally, ideologically, and legalistically." His
comments were not unfair. The general approach of the
commission was dominated by lawyers' thinking, and it failed
to consider some of the basic issues of the modern administrative
state, for example, procedures for policy-making and the ways
of making the exercise of discretion efficient and humane. 67
Willis' thinking about law and government can best be
summarized by dividing it into three parts. The first is his
observations and attitudes about government and its institu-
tions, which were expressed in almost every piece he wrote,
and especially in Parliamentary Powers and Three Approaches.
He perceived the nature and extent of the expansion of
government, and its implications for the structure and functions
of the legal institutions. He perceived a changing relation
between the individual and the community, and how legislative
policies were expanding the claims of the community against
the individual, and circumscribing common law powers. 68 He
seemed enthusiastic about these changes and about the errosion
of the traditional ideals, although he never declared this
enthusiasm openly. He had a great faith in experts, and he
believed the courts should give liberal scope to the agencies
on review. He expressed this attitude best in 1951: "the judges
... [should] exercise this exceedingly delicate power with
understanding and restraint; for it is the power to interfere with
the normal functioning of a government system of which in
these democratic days they are the least important arm." 69 This
first part of his thought was the least original part and least
developed.
67. "The McRuer report . supra note 61, at 351, 356 and 359. Some
evidence of the narrow visions of scholarship in the 1950s and 1960s, which
he had politely suggested in the Wright lecture by talking about the scope
of administrative law courses, is that he was the only academic to write in
a substantial way about more than doctrine and technical detail in considering
the report.
68. In his later writing his respect for the claims of the community led to
some strong arguments against civil liberties.
69. "Letter to the editor" supra note 60, at 585.
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The second part was his functionalism and his concern for
facts and "what really happens," in contrast to the abstractness
of the traditional vision, its faith in comprehensive rules, and
its preoccupation with doctrine, especially common law
doctrine. In its most general form, this concern was a belief
that facts were crucial to knowledge and understanding, and
its more simple and specific form was the argument that the
new despotism must be tested by looking at the exercise of
powers and not their mere existence. Institutions should be
assessed and designed according to their functions, and
administrative law scholarship, in particular, should not be
limited to abstract analysis of the doctrines of judicial review.
The most useful subjects for study were confined and specific
ones, and the most effective legal arrangements were ones
designed for particular contexts. In 1968 Willis declared "the
principle of 'uniqueness' is the principle for me."7 0
The third part of his thought was a challenge to the traditional
ideals for legal reasoning. In its most general form this challenge
was a skepticism of conceptual thinking, and this skepticism
was demonstrated most effectively in his analysis of the work
of courts in statutory interpretation and review of administrative
action, rather than in abstract speculation about the nature
of legal reasoning. He argued that interpretation and review
were not apolitical and autonomous, and that the traditional
doctrines and techniques did not determine results and often
masked choices made by courts. He described some of the
patterns and trends the choices made, especially the courts
determination to protect their vision of the constitution and
their own power. His explanations of these results usually
empahsized institutional considerations, for example, the
common law and its values, the general faith in the traditional
constitution, and the rules about the legitimate sources of
meaning in statutory interpretation. He also asserted that the
values of the courts themselves determined results, but he did
not generalize about the nature of these values and he did not
expressly discuss power or class.
The most distinctive form of his challenge to the traditional
ideals were his comments about the constellation of ideals he
called the lawyers' constitution - the rule of law, the separation
70. "The McRuer report..." supra note 61, at 359.
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of powers, the primacy of courts, the distinction between judicial
and administrative powers, and the rules about interpretation.
This constitution masked unstated assumptions and values, and
it was inaccurate, unworkable in the modern government, and
inconsistent with democratically-declared values. His most
effective insight was the way in which lawyers divided their
thoughts to accommodate both the constitution and reality.
This insight appeared first in Parliamentary Powers, and he
expressed it best in 1943 in a comment about Duncan v Cammell,
Laird & Co. Ltd.
I used to write articles attempting in my feeble way to inform
the legal profession of the facts of modern government. That
was an impertinent thing to do because they were even better
informed on them than I was myself; but it was also ...
a useless thing to do because the lawyer seems to have two
sides to his mind, one of them taking note of what really
happens in government which he uses for every day life, and
the other unconsciously disregarding the facts of modern
government which he uses when he comes to talk law.
7'
Although Willis never used the word "ideology," all of this
analysis was an striking demonstration of how ideas shape
perceptions and understanding.
His writing did not express a comprehensive jurisprudence
or a substantial programme for reform, and it contained internal
contradictions, and excesses and limitations, some of which were
the product of sheer exuberance. In retrospect, the faith in
government and expertise did not consider adequately the
difficulties of controling the expert and the bureaucracy, the
need to order the exercise of discretion, and the tangle between
politics and expertise. The functional approach was not
elaborated sufficiently to be much more than an exhortation,
and the stress on facts did not consider the need to fashion
some ordering conceptions that made facts significant or the
great difficulties of designing and doing the kind of research
he called for. The analysis of judicial reasoning did not offer
a consistent account of the roles of doctrine. Some passages
seemed to imply that doctrine had little or no effect and that
results were products of the beliefs and values of the courts.
Other passages seemed to imply that doctrine did have a
71. "Letter to the editor" [Courts and the executive - Duncan v. Cammell
Laird & Co. Ltd. [1942] 1 Alt ER 587] (1943), 21 Can BR 51.
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substantial effect, although the nature and effect of the effect
was not explained, and some articles and comments were entirely
exposition and analysis of doctrine. But ultimately the greatest
value of his thought is not the creation of a jurisprudence or
a programme. The value is the challenge to the traditional ideals.
Much of these ideals remain and much of them are valuable,
but they have been transformed. Our understandings of law
are different, and the kind of challenge Willis made marks much
of the difference.
Context can illuminate the nature and stature of his thought.
One of the widely-held propositions about Canadian legal
history is that we did not have a realist movement, and doubtless
we did not have the kind of transformation that the United
States experienced. But we did have at least one realist - John
Willis. He would protest at this label, because he would not
like being labelled at all, and because he did not participate
in any way in the realist movement as it- defined itself. And
it is, I suppose, a little late to revise the list of heros and add
an outsider. My assertion is, though, a useful beginning to
understanding his context.
Who were the realists? They were a group of academics, most
of them at a few eastern law schools, who built on earlier
elements in American legal thought, especially insights of
Holmes and the socialogical jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound,
and on general trends in the social sciences, especially scientific
naturalism, which professed a mistrust of abstract logic and
conceptual systems, and a faith in knowledge derived from
observation and experiment. Its crucial assumptions were
objecivism, particularism, and functionalism.72 Against the
background the realists made a transformation in American
legal thought. They were not a unified school, and a short list
of their characteristis may suggest more unity than is justified,
but it is useful nevertheless. They believed that law must be
openly and thoroughly instrumental, and they challenged
conceptual reasoning and the vision of an apolitical and
autonomous common law. They criticised the results the courts
had reached and ultimately the values that produced these
results. They mistrusted general and comprehensive approaches
72. See Purcell The Crisis of Democratic Theory (Kentucky 1973) for an
account of the intellectual background of the realist movement
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and solutions, and they stressed the importance of facts and
particular contexts. And they did not, in the end construct an
enduring and comprehensive programme. Does not this list also
describe Willis?
Despite these similarities, the influences that shaped his
approaches and ideas are difficult to determine. His writing
- the topics he chose, his style, and its organization and sources;
his relative isolation in Dalhousie; and his later recollections
all suggest that he did not steep himself continuously in the
current legal literature and that his ideas were not derived from
any specific source. His experience at Harvard and especially
the exposure to Frankfurter, shaped much of his thought,
especially his interest in the law about government and his
determination to study "what really happens." But he was not
merely a faithful follower. The elements of his thought that
distinguished him from Frankfurter and that he shared with
the realists were obviously not a product of a common cultural
and educational background with the realists - his background
was much different. These elements may have been formed long
before he became a legal scholar, in his youth and education
in England. He may also have grasped the currents of social
science thinking that were "in the air" through his general
reading. He read widely outside the law, and in a convocation
address given in 1973 he advised the graduates to read. "What
you must do is feed your imagination; don't read respectable
things like biography and history; read verse, read novels, ...
read anything that makes you see into the life of things.' "73
His writing had little influence in its own times. The courts
and practicing lawyers either ignored him or considered him
a dangerous radical. One example is a poignant irony. At the
time he wrote Three Approaches, and its attack on conceptual
reasoning in administrative law, the courts in Ontario embraced
a throughly conceptual approach to the distinction between
judicial and administrative functions that shaped Canadian
administrative law for decades. 74 The greatest understanding
and influence of his writing came long after the 1930s, and
my impression is that the expansion of visions of legal
73. (1973), Law Society Gazette 235, at 238.
74. This episode is described briefly in Risk (1984), 9 Dalhousie LJ 31, at
46.
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scholarship during the past decade has made teachers and
students respond more enthusiastically to it than they did during
the 1950s and 1960s.
My tribute to John Willis is almost done, and one of his
own conclusions can be my conclusion. At the end of his letter
to the editor about the Wheat Board case, he said,
My Nolan comment has obviously set up an emotional
disturbance in the breasts of [the two critics]. I think I know
why. I believe, and have believed for years that our
constitution is changing and that no banging of constitutional
bibles is going to stop it. As for me, I wish I was as
"enamoured" of the "brave new world" as [they] think I am;
but at any rate I refuse to be like [them] "walking backward
into the future lest a worse fate befall them."
75
I pay tribute to the wit, the insight, and the courage.
75. "Letter to the editor," supra note 60, at 585.
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